Consciousness unbound: social simulation theory of dreaming

Every night during sleep we experience an immersive world of dreams, woven together by our sleeping brain unbound by external stimulation. Despite considerable effort the question of why we dream has eluded a conclusive answer. Understanding dreams also arguably makes progress toward answering the broader question of consciousness: why do we experience anything at all? I attempt to illuminate these questions by concentrating on the quintessentially social nature of dreams. First, in Study I a novel theoretical account —the Social Simulation Theory of dreaming (SST)—is proposed, together with the first outlines of a research program for its empirical study. SST suggests the world simulation form of dreams provides clues for its function by preferentially simulating certain kinds of scenariosnamely social interactions. Second, in Studies II and III specific hypotheses derived from the SST in Study I are empirically evaluated. These provide evidence for dreams to contain more social content than corresponding waking life and to remain so even when social interactions are removed from waking life (Sociality Bias). Furthermore, the Strengthening Hypothesis that suggests dreams serve to maintain and/or increase social bonding with close others gains partial support. The Practise and Preparation Hypothesis gained support as dreams simulated positive interactions in one fifth of dream interactions and overall simulate complex social behaviours. The Compensation Hypothesis suggests dreams simulations to increase when waking social contacts are abolished, but this was not supported in the data as dream sociality remained stable despite social seclusion. When excluded from others our dreams reconfigure to decrease simulations of interactions with strangers. However, dreams during normal day-to-day life do not preferentially simulate bond-strengthening interactions with close others. In opposition to previous findings, Study II found no differences in social dream contents between either stage of sleep or time of night. In Study III a short social seclusion showed not only differences in dream content, but also in sleep structure, with an increase in REM sleep. Third, methodological development was undertaken by, both, developing a content analysis method for extracting social episodes in narrative reports (Social Content Scale, SCS; Study II), and by assessing the validity of a novel home sleep monitor device, the Beddit Sleep Tracker (BST). While the SCS proved useful for categorizing the social features in both studies II and III, BST failed to provide accurate sleep data as measured against a polysomnogram. Overall, the development of SST and the initial empirical evidence for some of its hypotheses brings us closer to understanding the twin problems of dreaming and consciousness.Kahlitsematon tajunta: unennäön sosiaalisen simulaation teoria Nukkuvat aivomme kehittävät joka yö ajankohtaisesta aistitiedosta riippumattoman monipuolisen ja todentuntuisen kokemuksen maailmasta—unen. Kysymykseen siitä miksi koemme unia ei ole yrityksistä huolimatta vielä saatu kattavaa vastausta. Unien luonteen ymmärtäminen toisi meitä todennäköisesti lähemmäs myös suuremman, tajunnan luonnetta koskevan kysymyksen ratkaisua: miksi ylipäänsä koemme mitään? Pyrin valottamaan näitä kysymyksiä keskittymällä erityisesti unien sosiaaliseen luonteeseen. Osatutkimuksessa I kehitämme uuden sosiaalisen simulaation teorian (SST) sekä esittelemme tutkimusohjelman sen väitteiden empiiriseen arviointiin. SST hyödyntää näkemystä unien maailma-simulaatio-muodosta ymmärtääkseen niiden funktiota, keskittyen erityisesti unien taipumukseen painottaa sosiaalisten tilanteiden simulointia. Osatutkimuksissa II ja III tutkimme SST:n hypoteeseja empiirisen unitutkimuksen keinoin. Sosiaalisuusvinouma unista poikkeuksellisen sosiaalisina kokemuksina saa vahvistusta löydöksestä, jossa unissa havaitaan olevan merkittävästi vastaavaa valvetta enemmän sosiaalisia tilanteita (II), ja vaikka sosiaalisia tilanteita ei esiintyisi arjessa, pysyy niiden määrä unissa ennallaan. Lisäksi vahvistushypoteesi, jonka mukaan unet vahvistavat erityisesti läheisiä ihmissuhteitamme, saa osittaista tukea. Osatutkimus III:ssa lyhyt sosiaalinen eristys johtaa muutoksiin unihahmojen luonteessa, unien alkaessa sisältää vähemmän tuntemattomien kanssa koettuja vuorovaikutustilanteita. Harjoitushypoteesi sai osin tukea unien simuloidessa monimutkaisia, ja viidenneksen positiivisia vuorovaikutustilanteita. Kompensaatio-hypoteesin mukaan vuorovaikutusunet lisääntyvät arjen sosiaalisten suhteiden poistuessa, mutta tämä ei saanut tukea unisosiaalisuuden pysyessä entisellään eristyksestä huolimatta. Normaalisti unissa emme kuitenkaan erityisesti simuloi vahvistavia vuorovaikutustilanteita läheisten kanssa, eivätkä unien sosiaaliset sisällöt eroa univaiheen tai nukkumisen keston mukaan (II). Sosiaalinen eristys kuitenkin lisäsi myös REM-unen osuutta. Lopuksi, väitöskirjassa menetelmäkehitystä edistettiin sekä luomalla uusi sisällönanalyysimenetelmä sosiaalisten tilanteiden luokitteluun (SCS) että tutkimalla unta mittaavan Beddit-unimittarin (BST) tarkkuutta mitata nukkumista ja univaiheita. Siinä missä SCS osoittautui käyttökelpoiseksi menetelmäksi sosiaalisten tilanteiden kategorisointiin, BST ei kyennyt esittämään luotettavaa tietoa unimuuttujista verrattuna unipolygrafiaan. Lopputulemana, SST ja sen ensimmäisten hypoteesien tutkimus tuo meidät lähemmäs unennäön ja tajunnan kaksoisongelmien ratkaisua

Running coupling in SU(2) with adjoint fermions

We present a measurement of the Schr\"odinger Functional running coupling in SU(2) lattice gauge theory with adjoint fermions. We use HEX smearing and clover improvement to reduce the discretization effects. We obtain a robust continuum limit for the step scaling, which confirms the existence of a non-trivial fixed point.Comment: Contribution to SCGT12 "KMI-GCOE Workshop on Strong Coupling Gauge Theories in the LHC Perspective", 4-7 Dec. 2012, Nagoya University, 4 pages, 2 figure

Consciousness unbound: Social simulation theory of dreaming

Every night during sleep we experience an immersive world of dreams, woven together by our sleeping brain unbound by external stimulation. Despite considerable effort the question of why we dream has eluded a conclusive answer. Understanding dreams also arguably makes progress toward answering the broader question of consciousness: why do we experience anything at all? I attempt to illuminate these questions by concentrating on the quintessentially social nature of dreams. First, in Study I a novel theoretical account —the Social Simulation Theory of dreaming (SST)—is proposed, together with the first outlines of a research program for its empirical study. SST suggests the world simulation form of dreams provides clues for its function by preferentially simulating certain kinds of scenariosnamely social interactions. Second, in Studies II and III specific hypotheses derived from the SST in Study I are empirically evaluated. These provide evidence for dreams to contain more social content than corresponding waking life and to remain so even when social interactions are removed from waking life (Sociality Bias). Furthermore, the Strengthening Hypothesis that suggests dreams serve to maintain and/or increase social bonding with close others gains partial support. The Practise and Preparation Hypothesis gained support as dreams simulated positive interactions in one fifth of dream interactions and overall simulate complex social behaviours. The Compensation Hypothesis suggests dreams simulations to increase when waking social contacts are abolished, but this was not supported in the data as dream sociality remained stable despite social seclusion. When excluded from others our dreams reconfigure to decrease simulations of interactions with strangers. However, dreams during normal day-to-day life do not preferentially simulate bond-strengthening interactions with close others. In opposition to previous findings, Study II found no differences in social dream contents between either stage of sleep or time of night. In Study III a short social seclusion showed not only differences in dream content, but also in sleep structure, with an increase in REM sleep. Third, methodological development was undertaken by, both, developing a content analysis method for extracting social episodes in narrative reports (Social Content Scale, SCS; Study II), and by assessing the validity of a novel home sleep monitor device, the Beddit Sleep Tracker (BST). While the SCS proved useful for categorizing the social features in both studies II and III, BST failed to provide accurate sleep data as measured against a polysomnogram. Overall, the development of SST and the initial empirical evidence for some of its hypotheses brings us closer to understanding the twin problems of dreaming and consciousness.</p

Dreaming and the weighted cognitive Rolodex: A review of The Emergence of Dreaming by William G. Domhoff

In his new book the eminent dream researcher William G. Domhoff restates the neurocognitive theory of dreams. It provides a lucid overview of decades of empirical research, combining it with recent neuroscientific research to form a theoretical whole. Providing a clear account of his theory Domhoff pivots the science of dreaming onwards, by posing a challenge for competing views. Domhoff, W.G. (2017). The Emergence of Dreaming: Mind-wandering, embodied simulation, and the default network. New York: Oxford University Press. </p

Mapping out the philosophical questions of AI and clinical practice in diagnosing and treating mental disorders

How to classify the human condition? This is one of the main problems psychiatry has struggled with since the first diagnostic systems. The furore over the recent edi- tions of the diagnostic systems DSM-5 and ICD-11 has evidenced it to still pose a wicked problem. Recent advances in techniques and methods of artificial intelligence and computing power which allows for the analysis of large data sets have been pro- posed as a possible solution for this and other problems in classification, diagnosing, and treating mental disorders. However, mental disorders contain some specific inherent features, which require critical consideration and analysis. The promises of AI for mental disorders are threatened by the unmeasurable aspects of mental disor- ders, and for this reason the use of AI may lead to ethically and practically undesir- able consequences in its effective processing. We consider such novel and unique questions AI presents for mental health disorders in detail and evaluate potential novel, AI-specific, ethical implications.Peer reviewe

The avatars in the machine : dreaming as a simulation of social reality

The idea that dreaming is a simulation of the waking world is currently becoming a far more widely shared and accepted view among dream researchers. Several philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have recently characterized dreaming in terms of virtual reality, immersive spatiotemporal simulation, or realistic and useful world simulation. Thus, the conception of dreaming as a simulated world now unifies definitions of the basic nature of dreaming within dream and consciousness research. This novel concept of dreaming has consequently led to the idea that social interactions in dreams, known to be a universal and abundant feature of human dream content, can best be characterized as a simulation of human social reality, simulating the social skills, bonds, interactions, and networks that we engage in during our waking lives. Yet this tempting idea has never before been formulated into a clear and empirically testable theory of dreaming. Here we show that a testable Social Simulation Theory (SST) of dreaming can be formulated, from which empirical predictions can be derived. Some of the predictions can gain initial support by relying on already existing data in the literature, but many more remain to be tested by further research. We argue that the SST should be tested by directly contrasting its predictions with the major competing theories on the nature and function of dreaming, such as the Continuity Hypothesis (CH) and the Threat Simulation Theory (TST). These three major theories of dreaming make differing predictions as to the quality and the quantity of social simulations in dreams. We will outline the first steps towards a theory-and-hypothesis-driven research program in dream research that treats dreaming as a simulated world in general and as a social simulation in particular. By following this research program it will be possible to find out whether dreaming is a relatively unselective and thus probably non-functional simulation of the waking world (CH), a simulation primarily specialized in the simulation of dangerous and threatening events that present important challenges for our survival and prosperity (TST), or whether it is a simulation primarily specialized in training the social skills and bonds most important for us humans as a social species (SST). Whatever the evidence for or against the specific theories turn out to be, in any case the conception of dreaming as a simulated world has already proved to be a fruitful theoretical approach to understanding the nature of dreaming and consciousness

The simulation theories of dreaming : how to make theoretical progress in dream science ; a reply to Martin Dresler

Among the most pressing challenges for dream science is the difficulty of establishing theoretical unification between the various theories, ideas, and findings that have been presented in the literature to answer the question of how it is possible to construct a solid scientific theory with predictive and explanatory power in dream science. We suggest that the concept of “world-simulation” serves as the core concept for a theoretically unified paradigm to describe and explain dreaming. From this general concept, more specific theories of the function of dreaming can be derived, such as the Threat Simulation Theory (TST) and the Social Simulation Theory (SST), as we argued in our target article. We agree with Dresler that these two functions may not be the only functions of dreaming, but we still have grounds to believe that they are the strongest contenders. In our reply we first clarify why the functions of sleep should be considered separately from the functions of dreaming. Second, we outline what a good scientific theory of dreaming should be like and what it should be capable of. Furthermore, we evaluate the current state of simulation theories within this context. To conclude, we propose that instead of a general multifunctional theory of sleep and dreaming, where no hypothesis is excluded, the future progress of dream science will benefit more from opposing, competing and mutually exclusive theories about the specific functions of dreaming. This, however, demands that the opposing theories and their predictions must be risky, clearly formulated, and empirically testable